> ## Documentation Index
> Fetch the complete documentation index at: https://docs.questarr.app/llms.txt
> Use this file to discover all available pages before exploring further.

# API

# API Reference

This document describes Questarr's external software interfaces: the REST
API exposed by the Express server, and the real-time events pushed over
Socket.io. It complements [`docs/ARCHITECTURE.md`](ARCHITECTURE.md) (system
actors and data flow) and [`docs/SECURITY_ASSESSMENT.md`](SECURITY_ASSESSMENT.md)
(risk assessment).

**Update policy:** re-run documentation generation for the affected route
group whenever `server/routes.ts` changes; manually update the Steam/
PCGamingWiki sections when `server/steam-routes.ts` or
`server/pcgamingwiki-router.ts` change.

## Overview

* **Base URL**: all endpoints are served under `/api` on the same origin as
  the app (default `http://localhost:5000`).
* **Format**: JSON request/response bodies throughout, except file uploads
  (`multipart/form-data` for SSL certificate upload) and the download bundle
  endpoint (`application/zip` response).
* **Authentication**: a JWT bearer token obtained from `POST /api/auth/login`
  (or `POST /api/auth/setup` for the first account), sent as
  `Authorization: Bearer <token>` on subsequent requests. Verified by
  `authenticateToken`/`optionalAuthenticateToken` in `server/auth.ts`. A
  global gate — `app.use("/api", authenticateToken)` in `server/routes.ts` —
  requires a valid JWT for every route registered after it; a small set of
  routes registered earlier remain public (see the Authentication section
  below). The `/api/integration` subtree additionally accepts a long-lived
  integration API key (see the Integration API section); every other route,
  including key management, is JWT-only.
* **Rate limiting**: `generalApiLimiter` (600 req/min/IP) applies to all
  `/api` routes; `authRateLimiter` additionally guards login;
  `sensitiveEndpointLimiter` additionally guards write-heavy/sensitive
  endpoints; `igdbRateLimiter` additionally guards IGDB proxy endpoints. See
  `server/middleware.ts`.

## Authentication

| Method | Path | Auth Required | Request Body | Response |
| - | - | - | - | - |
| GET | `/api/auth/status` | None (public) | — | `{ hasUsers: boolean }` |
| POST | `/api/auth/setup` | None (public; blocked once a user exists) | `{ username: string, password: string, igdbClientId?: string, igdbClientSecret?: string }` — manual type-checking only, not express-validator/Zod | `{ token, user: { id, username } }`; 403 if setup already completed; 400 on invalid input |
| POST | `/api/auth/login` | `authRateLimiter` (20 req / 15 min) | `{ username: string, password: string }` — manual type-checking only, no express-validator/Zod schema | `{ token, user: { id, username } }`; 401 on invalid credentials |
| GET | `/api/auth/me` | `authenticateToken` (JWT) | — | `{ id, username, steamId64 }` |
| PATCH | `/api/auth/password` | `authenticateToken` + `sensitiveEndpointLimiter` | `{ currentPassword: string, newPassword: string }` — validated via Zod `updatePasswordSchema` | `{ success: true, message }`; 401 if current password wrong; 400 `{ error, details }` on Zod failure |

`/api/auth/setup` and `/api/auth/login` are the two security-sensitive
endpoints that rely on inline `typeof` checks plus manual length/`if`
validation instead of an express-validator chain or a Zod schema (see the
risk register in `docs/SECURITY_ASSESSMENT.md`). `/api/auth/password` uses a
proper Zod schema (`updatePasswordSchema`).

Routes registered before the global `authenticateToken` gate (`server/routes.ts`,
before the auth-gate line) are public unless they explicitly list
`authenticateToken`: `/api/auth/*`, `/api/health`, `/api/settings/ssl`
(GET/PATCH), `/api/settings/ssl/generate`, `/api/settings/ssl/upload`,
`/api/system/filesystem`, `/api/config`. Everything registered after that
line — including `/api/ready` and every resource group below — requires a
JWT even where a table row doesn't repeat `authenticateToken`.

## Games

| Method | Path | Auth Required | Request Body | Response |
| - | - | - | - | - |
| GET | `/api/games` | JWT (global gate) | Query: `search?`, `includeHidden?`, `status?` (comma-separated or array) | `Game[]` |
| GET | `/api/games/status/:status` | JWT | Query: `includeHidden?` | `Game[]` |
| GET | `/api/games/search` | JWT + `sanitizeSearchQuery`, `validateRequest` | Query: `q` (1–200 chars, required), `search?` (≤200), `limit?` (1–100) | `Game[]`; 400 if `q` missing |
| POST | `/api/games` | JWT + `sensitiveEndpointLimiter`, `sanitizeGameData`, `validateRequest` | `{ title (1–500), igdbId?, summary? (≤5000), coverUrl? (URL), releaseDate? (YYYY-MM-DD), rating? (0–10), platforms?, genres?, publishers?, developers? }`, re-parsed via `insertGameSchema` (Zod) | 201 `Game`; 409 `{ error, game }` if duplicate; 400 `{ error, details }` on Zod failure |
| PATCH | `/api/games/:id/status` | JWT + `sensitiveEndpointLimiter`, `sanitizeGameId`, `sanitizeGameStatus`, `validateRequest` | `{ status: "wanted"\|"owned"\|"completed"\|"downloading" }` via `updateGameStatusSchema` | Updated `Game`; 404 if not found |
| PATCH | `/api/games/:id/hidden` | JWT + `sensitiveEndpointLimiter`, `sanitizeGameId`, `validateRequest` | `{ hidden: boolean }` via `updateGameHiddenSchema` | Updated `Game`; 404 if not found |
| PATCH | `/api/games/:id/user-rating` | JWT + `sensitiveEndpointLimiter`, `sanitizeGameId`, `validateRequest` | `{ userRating: number\|null }` (0.5–10, step 0.5) via `updateGameUserRatingSchema` | Updated `Game`; 404 if not found |
| PATCH | `/api/games/:id/installed-version` | JWT + `sensitiveEndpointLimiter`, `sanitizeGameId`, `validateRequest` | `{ installedVersion: string\|null }` (free text, trimmed, ≤64; blank clears) via `updateGameInstalledVersionSchema` | Updated `Game`; 404 if not found. Auto-search skips update releases whose version is not newer than this |
| POST | `/api/games/refresh-metadata` | JWT + `igdbRateLimiter` | — | `{ success, message, updatedCount, errorCount }` |
| DELETE | `/api/games/:id` | JWT + `sensitiveEndpointLimiter`, `sanitizeGameId`, `validateRequest` | Query: `deleteFiles?` ("true" to also remove the game's files on disk) | `{ success: true, fileDeletion }`; 404 if not found. `fileDeletion` is `null` when `deleteFiles` wasn't set, otherwise `{ deleted: true, path }` or `{ deleted: false, reason: "outside-library-root"\|"delete-failed", path }`. Files are only deleted when `libraryPath` resolves inside the configured library root **or** inside a root folder with `allowDelete: true` (see Root Folders below) |
| GET | `/api/games/:id/downloads` | JWT + `sanitizeGameId`, `validateRequest` (verifies game ownership) | — | `GameDownload[]`; 404 game not found, 403 not owner |
| GET | `/api/games/discover` | JWT + `igdbRateLimiter` | Query: `limit?` | `Game[]` (IGDB-formatted recommendations) |
| POST | `/api/games/match-and-add` | JWT | `{ title: string }` — manual `typeof` check, no validator | 201 `Game`; 404 if no IGDB match; 409 if already in collection |
| POST | `/api/games/:gameId/blacklist` | JWT (explicit) | `{ releaseTitle: string (required, ≤500) }` via `insertReleaseBlacklistSchema.safeParse` | 201 blacklist entry; 400 invalid; 403/404 via ownership check |
| GET | `/api/games/:gameId/blacklist` | JWT (explicit) | — | Blacklist entries array; 403/404 via ownership check |
| GET | `/api/games/:gameId/files` | JWT (explicit) + `scanRateLimiter` (10 req / min per user) | — | `{ files: { name, path, category, size }[], truncated: boolean }` — recursive scan of the game's library folder, bounded by `SCAN_MAX_FILES` (5,000) and a 5s wall-clock budget; `truncated: true` when either cap stopped the walk. Empty `{ files: [], truncated: false }` for missing/escaped paths; 403/404 via ownership check; 500 on unexpected I/O errors |
| PATCH | `/api/games/:gameId/files/category` | JWT (explicit) | Body: `{ path: string, category: "main" \| "dlc" \| "update" \| "extra" }` | `{ path, category }` — stores a user-chosen category for a file inside the game's folder (realpath must stay within the game folder and library root, else 404); sets `game_files.category_overridden` so later scans of `/files` report it instead of the folder/filename guess. 400 on invalid category; 403/404 via ownership check |
| DELETE | `/api/games/:gameId/blacklist/:id` | JWT (explicit) | — | 204; 404 if entry not found |
| DELETE | `/api/games/:id/downloads/:downloadId` | JWT + `sanitizeGameId`, `sanitizeDownloadId`, `validateRequest` | — | `{ success: true }`; 404 if game/download not found |

## Downloads

| Method | Path | Auth Required | Request Body | Response |
| - | - | - | - | - |
| GET | `/api/downloads` | JWT (global gate) | — | `{ downloads: (Download & { downloaderId, downloaderName, trackedByQuestarr, downloaderCategory })[], errors: {...}[] }` |
| GET | `/api/downloads/summary` | JWT (explicit) | — | Per-game download summary object |
| GET | `/api/downloads/scan` | JWT (explicit) | — | `{ groups: { baseTitle, downloads[], libraryMatch: {game, confidence}\|null }[] }` — untracked downloads grouped/matched to library |
| POST | `/api/downloads/claim` | JWT (explicit) | `{ downloaderId, downloadHash, downloadTitle, currentStatus, category, gameId? or newGame? }` via `claimDownloadRequestSchema.safeParse` | `{ success: true, gameId }`; 409 if already linked; 400/404 on invalid input |
| POST | `/api/downloads` | JWT + `sensitiveEndpointLimiter`, `sanitizeDownloaderDownloadData`, `validateRequest` | `{ url (http/https/magnet), title (1–500), category?, downloadPath? (no ".."), priority? (0–10), gameId? (uuid), downloadType?, password? (≤200 chars) }` | Add-with-fallback result across enabled downloaders; 400 if none configured; 500 on total failure |
| POST | `/api/downloads/bundle` | JWT + `sensitiveEndpointLimiter` | `{ downloads: { link, title, downloadType? }[] }` — manual array check only | Streams a `.zip` of fetched torrent/nzb files |

## Downloaders

| Method | Path | Auth Required | Request Body | Response |
| - | - | - | - | - |
| GET | `/api/downloaders` | JWT | — | `Downloader[]` (passwords masked as `********`) |
| GET | `/api/downloaders/enabled` | JWT | — | `Downloader[]` (masked) |
| GET | `/api/downloaders/storage` | JWT | — | `{ downloaderId, downloaderName, freeSpace, error? }[]`, cached 30s server-side |
| GET | `/api/downloaders/:id` | JWT | — | `Downloader` (masked); 404 if not found |
| POST | `/api/downloaders` | JWT + `sensitiveEndpointLimiter`, `sanitizeDownloaderData`, `validateRequest` | `{ name (1–200), type (transmission\|rtorrent\|qbittorrent\|sabnzbd\|nzbget), url (full URL or bare hostname/IP), username?, password?, enabled?, downloadPath? (no ".."), label?, urlPath? }` via `insertDownloaderSchema`; SSRF-checked via `isSafeUrl` | 201 `Downloader` (masked); 400 invalid/unsafe URL |
| PATCH | `/api/downloaders/:id` | JWT + `sensitiveEndpointLimiter`, `sanitizeDownloaderUpdateData`, `validateRequest` | Partial of above plus `priority?`, `category?`; `password` equal to the redacted placeholder = keep unchanged | Updated `Downloader` (masked); 404 if not found |
| DELETE | `/api/downloaders/:id` | JWT + `sensitiveEndpointLimiter` | — | 204; 404 if not found |
| POST | `/api/downloaders/test` | JWT | `{ type, url, port?, useSsl?, urlPath?, username?, password?, downloadPath?, category?, label?, ... }` — manual checks, SSRF-checked | Connection test result object |
| POST | `/api/downloaders/:id/test` | JWT | — | Connection test result for saved downloader; 404 if not found |
| POST | `/api/downloaders/:id/downloads` | JWT + `sensitiveEndpointLimiter`, `sanitizeDownloaderDownloadData`, `validateRequest` | `{ url, title, category?, downloadPath?, priority?, downloadType?, password? (≤200 chars) }` | Add-download result; 404 downloader not found; 400 if downloader disabled |
| GET | `/api/downloaders/:id/downloads` | JWT | — | Downloads array from that client; 404 if downloader not found |
| GET | `/api/downloaders/:id/downloads/:downloadId` | JWT | — | Single download status object; 404 if not found |
| GET | `/api/downloaders/:id/downloads/:downloadId/details` | JWT | — | Detailed info (files, trackers); 404 if not found |
| POST | `/api/downloaders/:id/downloads/:downloadId/pause` | JWT | — | Pause result object |
| POST | `/api/downloaders/:id/downloads/:downloadId/resume` | JWT | — | Resume result object |
| DELETE | `/api/downloaders/:id/downloads/:downloadId` | JWT | Query: `deleteFiles?` | Removal result object |

## Root Folders / Library Scan

Extra directories scanned (read-only discovery) for games already on disk outside the configured library root (e.g. an older library, a secondary drive). Separate from the library root used by the download-import pipeline — matched games get a `libraryPath` outside that root. Discovery itself never moves, renames, or deletes files there; the game-delete flow (`DELETE /api/games/:id?deleteFiles=true`) only touches files under a root folder when that folder's `allowDelete` is explicitly turned on (off by default).

| Method | Path | Auth Required | Request Body | Response |
| - | - | - | - | - |
| GET | `/api/root-folders` | JWT | — | `RootFolder[]` |
| POST | `/api/root-folders` | JWT + `sensitiveEndpointLimiter`, `sanitizeRootFolderData`, `validateRequest` | `{ path (1–1000, no null bytes), name? (≤200), enabled?, allowDelete? }` via `insertRootFolderSchema`; path probed on disk. `allowDelete` defaults to `false` | 201 `RootFolder`; 400 if path inaccessible; 409 if path already registered |
| PATCH | `/api/root-folders/:id` | JWT + `sensitiveEndpointLimiter`, `sanitizeRootFolderId`, `sanitizeRootFolderUpdateData`, `validateRequest` | Partial: `path?, name?, enabled?, allowDelete?` | Updated `RootFolder`; 400 if `:id` isn't a UUID; 404 if not found; 409 if new path already registered |
| DELETE | `/api/root-folders/:id` | JWT + `sensitiveEndpointLimiter`, `sanitizeRootFolderId`, `validateRequest` | — | 204; 400 if `:id` isn't a UUID; 404 if not found |
| POST | `/api/root-folders/:id/health-check` | JWT + `sensitiveEndpointLimiter`, `sanitizeRootFolderId`, `validateRequest` | — | Force-refreshed accessibility + disk stats for the folder; 400 if `:id` isn't a UUID; 404 if not found |
| POST | `/api/library/scan` | JWT + `sensitiveEndpointLimiter`, `sanitizeLibraryScanData`, `validateRequest` | `{ rootFolderId? }` via `sanitizeLibraryScanData` — optional, 1–200 chars if given; omit to scan all enabled root folders | 202 `{ accepted: true, rootFolderId }`; scan runs asynchronously; 400 `{ error: "Validation failed", details }` on invalid body |
| GET | `/api/library/scan/status` | JWT | — | `ScanProgress[]` — one entry per root folder scanned since server start |
| GET | `/api/library/scan/unmatched` | JWT | — | `UnmatchedEntry[]` — folders that didn't confidently match an IGDB game |
| POST | `/api/library/scan/unmatched/match` | JWT + `sensitiveEndpointLimiter`, `sanitizeUnmatchedMatchData`, `validateRequest` | `{ rootFolderId (1–200 chars), folderName (1–1000 chars), igdbId (positive integer) }` via `sanitizeUnmatchedMatchData` | `{ gameId, filesAdded }`; 400 `{ error: "Validation failed", details }` on invalid body; 500 with message on resolution failure |

## Indexers

| Method | Path | Auth Required | Request Body | Response |
| - | - | - | - | - |
| GET | `/api/indexers` | JWT | — | `Indexer[]` (apiKey masked) |
| GET | `/api/indexers/enabled` | JWT | — | `Indexer[]` (masked) |
| GET | `/api/indexers/search` | JWT (registered after the global auth gate, so `optionalAuthenticateToken` never actually sees an unauthenticated request) + `sanitizeIndexerSearchQuery`, `validateRequest` | Query: `query` (1–200, required), `category?`/`cat?` (≤500), `limit?` (1–100), `offset?` (≥0), `gameId?` | `{ items, total, offset, blacklistedCount?, errors? }` |
| GET | `/api/indexers/:id` | JWT | — | `Indexer` (masked); 404 if not found |
| POST | `/api/indexers` | JWT + `sensitiveEndpointLimiter`, `sanitizeIndexerData`, `validateRequest` | `{ name (1–200), url (http/https, SSRF-checked), apiKey? (≤500), protocol? (torznab\|newznab), enabled? }` via `insertIndexerSchema` | 201 `Indexer` (masked); 400 invalid/unsafe URL |
| PATCH | `/api/indexers/:id` | JWT + `sensitiveEndpointLimiter`, `sanitizeIndexerUpdateData`, `validateRequest` | Partial: `name?, url?, apiKey?, protocol?, enabled?, priority? (≥1), categories?, rssEnabled?, autoSearchEnabled?`; apiKey placeholder = keep unchanged | Updated `Indexer` (masked); 404 if not found |
| DELETE | `/api/indexers/:id` | JWT + `sensitiveEndpointLimiter` | — | 204; 404 if not found |
| POST | `/api/indexers/test` | JWT | `{ name?, url (required, SSRF-checked), apiKey (required), enabled?, priority?, categories?, rssEnabled?, autoSearchEnabled? }` — manual checks only | Torznab connection test result |
| POST | `/api/indexers/:id/test` | JWT | — | Connection test result for saved indexer; 404 if not found |
| GET | `/api/indexers/:id/categories` | JWT | — | Category list from indexer; 404 if not found |
| GET | `/api/indexers/:id/search` | JWT | Query: `query` (required), `category?`/`cat?`, `limit?` (default 50), `offset?` (default 0) | Search results from that single indexer; 400 if query missing, 404 if not found |
| POST | `/api/indexers/prowlarr/sync` | JWT + `sensitiveEndpointLimiter` | `{ url: string, apiKey: string }` — manual checks, SSRF-checked | `{ success, message, results }` |
| GET | `/api/search` | JWT (same global-gate note as above; alias of `/api/indexers/search`) + `sanitizeIndexerSearchQuery`, `validateRequest` | Same as `/api/indexers/search` | Same as `/api/indexers/search` |

## IGDB

| Method | Path | Auth Required | Request Body | Response |
| - | - | - | - | - |
| GET | `/api/igdb/search` | JWT + `igdbRateLimiter`, `sanitizeSearchQuery`, `validateRequest` | Query: `q` (1–200, required), `limit?` (1–100) | Formatted IGDB game array |
| GET | `/api/igdb/popular` | JWT + `igdbRateLimiter` | Query: `limit?` | Formatted game array; `Cache-Control: public, max-age=3600, stale-while-revalidate=600` |
| GET | `/api/igdb/recent` | JWT + `igdbRateLimiter` | Query: `limit?` | Formatted game array; same cache header |
| GET | `/api/igdb/upcoming` | JWT + `igdbRateLimiter` | Query: `limit?` | Formatted game array; same cache header |
| GET | `/api/igdb/genre/:genre` | JWT + `igdbRateLimiter` | Path `:genre` (≤100 chars); query `limit?`, `offset?` | Formatted game array; same cache header |
| GET | `/api/igdb/platform/:platform` | JWT + `igdbRateLimiter` | Path `:platform` (≤100 chars); query `limit?`, `offset?` | Formatted game array; same cache header |
| GET | `/api/igdb/genres` | JWT + `igdbRateLimiter` | — | Genre list; `Cache-Control: public, max-age=86400, stale-while-revalidate=3600` |
| GET | `/api/igdb/platforms` | JWT + `igdbRateLimiter` | — | Platform list; same 24h cache header |
| GET | `/api/igdb/game/:id` | JWT + `igdbRateLimiter`, `sanitizeIgdbId`, `validateRequest` | Path `:id` (positive integer) | Formatted IGDB game; 404 if not found |

## Settings

| Method | Path | Auth Required | Request Body | Response |
| - | - | - | - | - |
| GET | `/api/settings/ssl` | `authenticateToken` (pre-gate) | — | SSL config plus optional `certInfo` (subject, issuer, validity, selfSigned) |
| PATCH | `/api/settings/ssl` | `authenticateToken` + `sensitiveEndpointLimiter` (pre-gate) | `{ enabled: boolean, port: number, certPath?, keyPath?, redirectHttp? }` — manual checks; cert/key paths path-traversal checked against `FILE_BROWSER_ROOT` | `{ success, message }`; 400/403 on invalid config or disallowed path |
| POST | `/api/settings/ssl/generate` | `authenticateToken` + `sensitiveEndpointLimiter` (pre-gate) | — | `{ success, message, certPath, keyPath }` (self-signed cert) |
| POST | `/api/settings/ssl/upload` | `authenticateToken` + `sensitiveEndpointLimiter` (pre-gate) | Multipart form: `cert` file + `key` file (5 MB limit, memory storage); validated as PEM | `{ success, message, certPath, keyPath }`; 400 if missing/invalid PEM |
| GET | `/api/system/filesystem` | `authenticateToken` + `sensitiveEndpointLimiter` (pre-gate) | Query: `path?` (relative; absolute paths/NUL bytes rejected; confined to `FILE_BROWSER_ROOT`) | `{ path, parent, files: {name, path, isDirectory, size}[] }`; 403 on traversal, 404 if missing |
| GET | `/api/config` | `sensitiveEndpointLimiter` only, no JWT (pre-gate, public) | — | `{ igdb: { configured, source }, xrel: { apiBase } }` |
| GET | `/api/settings/igdb` | JWT + `sensitiveEndpointLimiter` | — | `{ configured, source, clientId }` |
| POST | `/api/settings/igdb` | JWT + `sensitiveEndpointLimiter` | `{ clientId: string (required), clientSecret?: string }` — manual checks; redacted-placeholder secret = keep existing | `{ success: true }`; 400 if client secret required but missing |
| GET | `/api/settings/discord` | JWT + `sensitiveEndpointLimiter` | — | `{ configured: boolean, webhookUrl?: "********" }` |
| POST | `/api/settings/discord` | JWT + `sensitiveEndpointLimiter` | `{ webhookUrl?: string }` — must be a `discord.com`/`discordapp.com` webhook URL; redacted placeholder = keep unchanged | `{ success: true }`; 400 on invalid webhook URL |
| GET | `/api/settings` | JWT | — | `UserSettings` (created with defaults if none exist) |
| PATCH | `/api/settings` | JWT | Validated via `updateUserSettingsSchema` (Zod) | Updated `UserSettings`; 400 `{ error, details }` on Zod failure |
| PATCH | `/api/settings/xrel` | JWT | `{ apiBase?: string (http/https, SSRF-checked, must match ALLOWED_XREL_DOMAINS), xrelSceneReleases?: boolean, xrelP2pReleases?: boolean }` — manual checks | `{ success, xrel: { apiBase }, settings? }`; 400 on invalid/unsafe/unauthorized domain |
| GET | `/api/settings/nexusmods` | JWT + `sensitiveEndpointLimiter` | — | `{ configured: boolean, source?: "env"\|"database" }` |
| POST | `/api/settings/nexusmods` | JWT + `sensitiveEndpointLimiter` | `{ apiKey: string (required) }` | `{ success: true }`; 400 if missing |

## RSS

| Method | Path | Auth Required | Request Body | Response |
| - | - | - | - | - |
| GET | `/api/rss/feeds` | JWT | — | `RssFeed[]` |
| POST | `/api/rss/feeds` | JWT | Validated via `insertRssFeedSchema` (Zod); URL SSRF-checked | 201 `RssFeed`; 400 on Zod/unsafe-URL failure (triggers async initial refresh) |
| PUT | `/api/rss/feeds/:id` | JWT | Partial `insertRssFeedSchema` | Updated `RssFeed`; 404 if not found; 400 if unsafe URL |
| DELETE | `/api/rss/feeds/:id` | JWT | — | 204; 404 if not found |
| GET | `/api/rss/items` | JWT | Query: `limit?` (default 100) | `RssFeedItem[]` |
| POST | `/api/rss/refresh` | JWT | — | `{ success: true }` (triggers refresh of all feeds) |

## Notifications

| Method | Path | Auth Required | Request Body | Response |
| - | - | - | - | - |
| GET | `/api/notifications` | JWT (explicit) | Query: `limit?` (default 50) | `Notification[]` |
| GET | `/api/notifications/unread-count` | JWT (explicit) | — | `{ count: number }` |
| POST | `/api/notifications` | JWT (explicit) | Validated via `insertNotificationSchema` (Zod) | 201 `Notification` (also emitted over Socket.io); 400 on Zod failure |
| PUT | `/api/notifications/:id/read` | JWT (explicit) | — | Updated `Notification`; 404 if not found |
| PUT | `/api/notifications/read-all` | JWT (explicit) | — | `{ success: true }` |
| DELETE | `/api/notifications` | JWT (explicit) | — | 204 (clears all read notifications) |

## Error Telemetry

Backs the consent flow opened from an "error-detected" notification's link
(`error-report:<reportId>`). Reports are built server-side from recent,
PII-scrubbed `server.log` lines when an unhandled server error is detected
(uncaught exception, unhandled rejection, or a 5xx response); see
`server/error-telemetry.ts`. Pending reports are held in memory only (not
persisted), scoped to the user they were created for, and expire after 24h.

| Method | Path | Auth Required | Request Body | Response |
| - | - | - | - | - |
| GET | `/api/telemetry/pending/:reportId` | JWT (explicit) | — | `{ lineCount, appVersion, platform, timestamp }`; 404 if expired/unknown/not owned by the caller |
| POST | `/api/telemetry/pending/:reportId/send` | JWT (explicit) | — | `{ code, issueNumber }` (same shape as the manual "Send Logs" flow); 422 if unavailable (unknown/expired/not owned) or delivery fails |

`reportId` must be a UUID (validated via express-validator). For GET, a report
owned by another user is indistinguishable from an unknown/expired one — both
return 404 — so a caller can't probe for the existence of another user's
report. POST folds the same "not available" cases (unknown, expired, or not
owned) into the 422 it already uses for delivery failures, since
`sendPendingReport` doesn't distinguish them from the caller's perspective.

Whether an error triggers a notification at all is controlled by the
`errorDetected` notification preference; whether it's reported automatically
(skipping the consent step above) is controlled by the per-user
`telemetryEnabled` setting (Settings > System > Telemetry, off by default).

## xREL

| Method | Path | Auth Required | Request Body | Response |
| - | - | - | - | - |
| GET | `/api/xrel/latest` | JWT | Query: `page?` (default 1) | `{ ...xrelResult, list: [...releases annotated with libraryStatus, gameId, isWanted, matchCandidate?] }` |
| GET | `/api/xrel/search` | JWT | Query: `q` (required), `scene?` (default true unless "false"/"0"), `p2p?`, `limit?` (1–100, default 25) | `{ results: [...] }`; 400 if `q` missing |

`PATCH /api/settings/xrel` (xREL API base URL and scene/P2P release
preferences) is documented under [Settings](#settings).

## NexusMods

| Method | Path | Auth Required | Request Body | Response |
| - | - | - | - | - |
| GET | `/api/nexusmods/game-domain` | JWT | Query: `title` (required) | `{ configured: boolean, domain: string\|null }`; 400 if title missing |
| GET | `/api/nexusmods/trending-mods` | JWT | Query: `domain` (required), `limit?` (1–20, default 10) | Trending mods array; 400 if domain missing |

NexusMods API-key configuration (`GET`/`POST /api/settings/nexusmods`) is
documented under [Settings](#settings).

## Stats

| Method | Path | Auth Required | Request Body | Response |
| - | - | - | - | - |
| POST | `/api/stats/discord-share` | JWT | `{ image: string (data URI, png/jpeg/gif/webp base64), message?: string }` — manual checks; webhook URL must match Discord's domain pattern | `{ success: true }`; 400 on missing/invalid config or image; 502 if Discord request fails |

## Health / Ready / Config

| Method | Path | Auth Required | Request Body | Response |
| - | - | - | - | - |
| GET | `/api/health` | None (public, pre-gate) | — | `{ status: "ok" }` (liveness probe only, no dependency checks) |
| GET | `/api/ready` | JWT (registered after the global auth gate, so a token is required despite being a readiness probe) | — | `{ status: "ok" }` (200) if DB + IGDB checks succeed, else `{ status: "error" }` (503) |
| GET | `/api/config` | `sensitiveEndpointLimiter` only, no JWT (public, pre-gate) | — | `{ igdb: { configured, source }, xrel: { apiBase } }` |

## Dashboard Status

| Method | Path | Auth Required | Request Body | Response |
| - | - | - | - | - |
| GET | `/api/status` | JWT | — | `{ totalGames, pendingWishlist, activeDownloads, recentImports: { count, items: [{ gameId, title, completedAt }] } }` — lightweight stats for external dashboard widgets (Homepage, Homarr, Organizr, etc.), excludes hidden games; response sent with `Cache-Control: no-store`. `pendingWishlist` counts games with status `wanted`; `activeDownloads` counts downloads with status `downloading`/`paused`; `recentImports` is scoped to downloads completed in the last 7 days — `count` is the total in that window, `items` are the same window's 5 most recent (never older imports, even when fewer than 5 exist). |

## HowLongToBeat

| Method | Path | Auth Required | Request Body | Response |
| - | - | - | - | - |
| GET | `/api/hltb/lookup` | JWT (explicit) | Query: `title` (required) | `{ data: HltbResult \| null }`; 400 if title missing |

## Blacklist

| Method | Path | Auth Required | Request Body | Response |
| - | - | - | - | - |
| GET | `/api/blacklist` | JWT (explicit) | — | All blacklist entries across the user's games (`ReleaseBlacklist[]`) |

Per-game blacklist management (`POST`/`GET`/`DELETE /api/games/:gameId/blacklist*`)
is documented under [Games](#games).

## Steam

`server/steam-routes.ts` — 2 routes, mounted directly on the app (no prefix
router), both behind the global auth gate plus explicit `authenticateToken`.

| Method | Path | Auth Required | Request Body | Response |
| - | - | - | - | - |
| PATCH | `/api/user/steam-id` | JWT | `{ steamId: string }` — must be a 17-digit SteamID64 starting with `7656` (`steamService.validateSteamId`) | `{ success: true, steamId }`; 400 if missing/invalid format |
| POST | `/api/steam/wishlist/sync` | JWT | — | `{ success, addedCount, games }` (via `syncUserSteamWishlist`); 400 if Steam ID not linked or sync fails |

## PCGamingWiki

`server/pcgamingwiki-router.ts` — 1 route.

| Method | Path | Auth Required | Request Body | Response |
| - | - | - | - | - |
| GET | `/api/external/pcgamingwiki` | JWT | Query: `steamAppId` (required, positive integer) | `{ url: string \| null }`; 400 if `steamAppId` missing/invalid; result cached 24h (5min on lookup failure) |

## Integration API (external clients)

`server/routes/integration.ts` — 4 routes, mounted at `/api/integration`.

This is the one part of the API that accepts a long-lived **integration API
key** in addition to a JWT, for machine clients that cannot run the interactive
login flow — the [Playnite extension](../extensions/playnite-questarr/README.md),
scripts, other self-hosted tools. The key is presented as `X-Api-Key: <key>` or
`Authorization: Bearer <key>` (keys are recognised by their `qsr_` prefix, so a
Bearer header is unambiguous between a key and a JWT).

Authentication is handled by `authenticateApiKeyOrToken` in `server/auth.ts`,
selected by `requireAuthenticationForApi` for paths under `/integration` only.
Everywhere else on `/api` — key management included — stays JWT-only, so a
leaked key cannot escalate into minting or revoking other keys.

| Method | Path | Auth Required | Request Body | Response |
| - | - | - | - | - |
| GET | `/api/integration/ping` | JWT or API key | — | `{ service: "questarr", version, apiVersion, authenticatedAs: { id, username }, usingApiKey }` |
| GET | `/api/integration/library` | JWT or API key | Query: `status` (optional, comma-separated), `includeHidden` (optional, `"true"`/`"false"`) | `{ games: IntegrationGame[], count }`; 400 on invalid query |
| POST | `/api/integration/library/sync` | JWT or API key | `{ games: Array<{ title, externalId?, installed?, steamAppId? }> (1–5000), markInstalledAsOwned?: boolean }` — Zod-validated | `{ received, matched, unmatched, promotedToOwned }`; 400 on invalid payload |
| POST | `/api/integration/games/request` | JWT or API key | `{ title: string, status?: "wanted" \| "owned" }` — Zod-validated | 201 `{ game }`; 404 if IGDB has no match or the match is content-filtered; 409 if already in library |

`IntegrationGame` is a deliberately narrow projection of a library game —
`id`, `title`, `igdbId`, `steamAppId`, `status`, `releaseStatus`, `releaseDate`,
`coverUrl`, `platforms`, `genres`, `libraryPath`, `addedAt`. Internal fields
(`userId`, `notes`, search-result bookkeeping) are never exposed.

`apiVersion` (`INTEGRATION_API_VERSION`) describes the integration contract
itself and is bumped only when a change would break an already-released client,
so an extension can fail loudly on a mismatch instead of misbehaving mid-sync.

**Sync matching**: an incoming entry is matched against the caller's library by
Steam App ID first, then by normalized title (`normalizeTitle` from
`shared/title-utils.ts`). Unmatched entries are reported back rather than
added — a sync never creates library entries on its own. `markInstalledAsOwned`
promotes a matched game from `wanted` to `owned` only when the client reports it
installed, and is off by default.

**Requesting a game**: a requested game is added with status `wanted`, which is
what hands it to the existing auto-search pipeline (`checkAutoSearch` in
`server/cron.ts`) — that is how a request from the couch turns into a download.

## API Keys (management)

`server/routes/api-keys.ts` — 3 routes, mounted at `/api/api-keys`, **JWT only**.

Keys are stored as a SHA-256 hash plus a short display prefix; the raw key is
returned exactly once, in the 201 response that creates it, and is not
recoverable afterwards. A user may hold at most 25 keys.

| Method | Path | Auth Required | Request Body | Response |
| - | - | - | - | - |
| GET | `/api/api-keys` | JWT | — | `Array<{ id, userId, name, prefix, createdAt, lastUsedAt }>` — never includes the hash |
| POST | `/api/api-keys` | JWT + `sensitiveEndpointLimiter` | `{ name: string }` (1–100 chars) | 201 `{ id, userId, name, prefix, createdAt, lastUsedAt, key }` — `key` is shown only here; 409 once 25 keys exist |
| DELETE | `/api/api-keys/:id` | JWT + `sensitiveEndpointLimiter` | — | 204; 404 if the key does not exist or belongs to another user |

## Error Format

Across handlers, error responses follow one of these consistent shapes:

* **Validation failures (express-validator chains)**: the shared
  `validateRequest` middleware (`server/middleware.ts`) runs after any
  `sanitize*` validator array. On failure it returns HTTP 400 with:
  ```json theme={null}
  {
    "error": "Validation failed",
    "details": [/* express-validator error objects: { type, msg, path, location, value } */]
  }
  ```
* **Validation failures (Zod schemas)**: handlers that call
  `someSchema.parse(req.body)` catch `z.ZodError` directly and return HTTP
  400 with:
  ```json theme={null}
  {
    "error": "Invalid <thing> data",
    "details": [/* ZodError.errors array */]
  }
  ```
  (message text varies per handler, e.g. "Invalid game data", "Invalid
  status data", "Invalid settings data")
* **Ad hoc business-logic errors**: most handlers return a plain
  `{ "error": "<message>" }` object directly for 400/401/403/404/409/502
  cases (sometimes with an extra field attached, e.g. `{ error, game }` on a
  duplicate-game 409), without going through shared middleware.
* **Uncaught/rethrown errors (global handler)**: routes that call
  `next(error)` fall through to `errorHandler` (`server/middleware.ts`),
  which returns:
  ```json theme={null}
  {
    "error": "<message, or 'Internal Server Error' in production for 5xx>",
    "details": "<only if err.details was set>"
  }
  ```
  Status comes from `err.status`/`err.statusCode`, defaulting to 500. In
  production, 5xx messages are sanitized to `"Internal Server Error"` to
  avoid leaking internals; 4xx messages pass through as-is. All errors are
  logged via Pino with method/path context — `error` level for 5xx, `warn`
  otherwise.
* **No-content success**: several `DELETE` endpoints return `204 No Content`
  with an empty body rather than a JSON payload (e.g. `DELETE /api/games/:id`,
  `DELETE /api/indexers/:id`, `DELETE /api/downloaders/:id`,
  `DELETE /api/rss/feeds/:id`, `DELETE /api/notifications`).

## Real-time interface (Socket.io)

Alongside the REST API, the server pushes real-time events over Socket.io
(`server/socket.ts`). See [`docs/ARCHITECTURE.md` §6](ARCHITECTURE.md#6-out-of-band-channel-socketio)
for the full actor/data-flow explanation. Summary:

| Event | Emitted from | Payload | Consumed by |
| - | - | - | - |
| `notification` | `cron.ts` (game updates, download completion, auto-search results, xREL matches) and `routes.ts` | `Notification` object | `client/src/components/NotificationCenter.tsx` |
| `downloadUpdate` | `cron.ts::checkDownloadStatus` | `gameId: string` | `client/src/components/GameDetailsModal.tsx` |

Both events are broadcast to every connected socket (`io.emit`) — there are
no per-user rooms yet.


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